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Jan Winiecki
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATISATION:
POLAND IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Regardless of one's stand on the privatisation issue, there is
certainly one point on which all protagonists and antagonists of
privatisation agree. This is the political importance of the issue
in question. Privatisation part of the transition to the market
system is a major political, nor only economic change. Therefore,
it should be analysed not only in economic but also in political
terms. Politics, or, more precisely, political economy of
privatisation is, then, a legitimate - and highly relevant - topic
of analysis.
Preferences and interests of various actors (public and private
ones), ways of articulating these preferences and interests,
actors' interaction with the political system, etc., all impinge
upon privatisation process and outcomes. Also, the political
environment within which the transition has been taking place is of
great significance to privatisation.
Finally, since transition away from the centrally planned,
Soviet-type economy is without precedent, any expectations with
respect to both process and outcomes have to be based upon
privatisation experience elsewhere. It is this experience that the
present writer will look into, first in order to form preliminary
expectations about the political economy of privatisation in
Poland. First section deals, then, with political economy of
privatisation in post-Soviet-type economies (post-STEs for short) ,,
in comparison with that in developing countries (LDCs for short).
ECONOMICS VS. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATISATIONS
DIVERGING EXPECTATIONS
The present writer belongs to those who stress the existence of
differences between post-STEs and LDCs undergoing transition to the
(tolerably) well functioning market system. There are problems in
the former, resulting from impact of the economic system alien to
the market, which are not encountered in the transition process in
the latter (see, e.g., Winiecki, 1990c). Some other problems have
impact of differing magnitude in each set of countries due to the
different degree of responsiveness of economic agents to
institutional and policy changes in the respective economies (see,
e.g., Beksiak, Gruszecki, Jedraszczyk and Winiecki, 1989).
These differences have their system-specific rationale. There
are significant differences between transition path from non-market
to market economy and that from pre-market or distorted market to
the tolerably well functioning market economy. The latter path is,
even intuitively, less difficult. This assessment applies, in my
opinion, to all major building blocks of the transition, that is
to stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation.
To begin with, it is easier, e.g., to decontrol interest rate
and eliminate credit ceilings or preferences for state-owned
enterprises (SOEs for short) if there are already banks with past
experience of prudent lending policies (even if these banks were- 2 -
in the pre-transition period arm-twisted to favour this or that
SOE supported by influential politicians or political groupings).
In STEs banks were little more than than cashier's windows for
state enterprises implementing various plan targets and drawing on
various funds located in the banks. Of course, symbiosis between
economics and politics in STEs ensured that political influences
distorted planned disbursement patterns (see, i.a., Winiecki, 1989,
1991). But there was no , place whatsoever for prudent lending
policies. -../••'
Therefore, once the transition begins, behaviour of banks in
LDCs is markedly closer to normal banking practices in mature
Western market economies than in post-STEs, where more often than
not banks have to begin by learning the ABC of real banking. In
post-STEs old pattern of behaviour prevails between state-owned
banks and their old state-owned clients. With no prudent lending
policies to speak of, 'banks without owners' (that is, state-owned
banks) continue their lending regardless of the creditworthiness
of borrowers and 'enterprises without owners' (that is, state-owned
enterprises) continue their borrowing regardless of the interest
rate level. Effectiveness of monetary policy is severely impaired
as a result.
Another example also concerns monetary policy. In countries
where regulation allow domestic economic agents to buy only own
government bonds thare is already a degree of sophistication with
respect to financial markets. However constrained, economic agents
react to differences in nominal yield, current yield and yield-to-
maturity among various issues and over time. They may be at times
reluctant to accept too large a share of government bonds in their
portfolio but at least they know what portfolio is about and how
to manage it. This basic knowledge possessed by agents of such a
constrained market is missing in the case of post-STEs. Open market
operations of monetary policy will need a lot of time to get
started.
The present writer could enumerate a long list of market
institutions existing in distorted market economies such as, e.g.,
Argentina or Brasil but conspicuously missing in post-STEs at the
start of the transition. Even least developed LDCs are in more
advantageous situation vis-a-vis post-STEs in some respects. No
matter how 'dirigiste' are the governments of these economies,
their control, although wide is at the same time rather shallow
(due to the lack of administrative capacity). Therefore, beneath
the layer of regulations and arbitrary interventions local markets
perform somehow and market-like behaviour is a normal state of the
art everywhere except in the large SOEs, where waiting for orders
from above is more typical. Opposite is, however, the case in STEs.
Accordingly post-Soviet-type economies inherit this passivity of
the overwhelmingly large part of economic agents,
The case of privatisation is not any different. After all, even
in most 'dirigiste' economies, such as, e.g., India, there exists
private sector. Sometimes it is even numerically dominant, but it
is severely constrained and behaves in an aberrant manner due to
policy-induced distortions. There is already a capitalist class:
some industrialists, merchants, even bankers. There are many more
small businessmen, often in the informal sector. Consequently,- 3 -
there are experienced individuals (or groups of individuals)
competent enough and sometimes wealthy enough to take control of
privatised enterprises. The change in the structure of property
rights through privatisation is much more difficult in post-STEs,
where there is very little experience of this sort and the wealth
is mostly in unacceptable hands of communist nomenklatura that
enriched itself through ripping off state- enterprises.
Therefore, the e c o n o m i c" s of transition to the
tolerably well functioning market economy is markedly easier in
liberalising and privatising LDCs than in post-STEs. Also, benefits
of transition may be expected earlier in the former, given steeper
learning curve there (quite often it is a re-learning curve, which
is obviously steeper stilll). Incidentally, this difference is
often missed by Western advisers to post-STEs of East-Central
Europe.
The foregoing concerns, however, only one aspect of the
transition. There is another, no less important aspect of the
transition, including its privatisation component, and it is the
attitude of political and, economic actors toward the transitions
their preferences, interests, ways of articulating these interests,
etc. It is in the case of the political economy of
transition that, in the opinion of the present writer, post-STEs
have certain advantage over LDCs.
Lai (1987) stressed that analysis of liberalisation (and by this
term he understood also stabilisation) is usually conducted within
what he called 'technocratic framework', which assumes a benevolent
and well informed government, with altruistic policy-makers
maximising some social utility function subject to 'normal' (that
is resource and technological) constraints. In the new political
economy literature, based on various strands of neo-institutional
economics, such view of the state and its agents is seen as highly
misleading in general, and in the case of LDCs in particular.
It is in these countries that the concept of 'predatory state'
(see North, 1979 and 1981) applies with full force. Another case
are STEs (see Winiecki, 1987, 1990a and 1991). The state is, then,
a group of self-seeking individuals (rulers) whose interests are
not necessarily in accord with those of the public. They maximise
their utility subject to survival considerations, agency costs of
constraining their subordinates and measurement costs (particularly
the cost of measuring the tax base).
Under the circumstances liberalisation - or privatisation for
that matter - is rarely the first choice of such government or the
ruling stratum in the predatory state. As Lai puts it 'it is rare
for liberalisation to follow some intellectual conversion of
policy-makers who, having seen errors of their ways, seek to find
a second best welfare maximising transition from a controlled to
a market economy' (ibid., p.281). Rather, with one failed attempt
to exercise control over ever-larger extent of economic activity
following another, they reach the end of the road of 'dirigisme',
finding their control over the economy weakening at a fast rate.
Economy becomes unmanageable and, in consequence, their ability to
extract rent shrinks accordingly.
There is - says Lai - a sort of 'Laffer curve' of
interventionism, so that at a certain stage intervention diminishes- 4
rather than increases the extent of control. Liberalisation in such
a predatory state is, then, seen as a concession made by the
ruling stratum in order to regain a measure of government control
over the economy. In other terms, the cost of not liberalising for
the ruling stratum is - under the circumstances -. even greater.
The same analysis applies by analogy to privatisation. It is
also rarely the first choice of the rulers. They usually tried
other measures first. They decentralised and recentralised,
commercialised and restructured SOEs and tried many other things,
too. Usually to little avail for privatisation means exposing
enterprises to the impact of market forces, while the other
measures are at best surrogates. Therefore they try privatisation
as a measure of last resort (see, i.a., Elicker, 1988 and
Savas, 1987). They understand it very well that they have to give
up their patronage in privatised enterprises, as well as other
rents. But again, this is the price of not losing control
altogether in the unmanageable, hyperinflationary and imploding
economy (the last term meaning the shift from registered to
unregistered and therefore uncontrollable economy, see de Soto,
1989).
This situation is all but non-existent in post- STEs, where
after the political regime change (the necessary condition for
success of economic transition, see Winiecki, 1990b) any government
is clearly committed to the shift to the market system. Whatever
differences may exists within the new ruling elite (and often
within the government), they concern the speed of transition and
the extent to which markets should operate ufettered. The direction
of change is not contested even by the old ruling elite.
In fact, political economy of transition in LDCs is much closer
to that of 'reforming' STEs. In the latter, too, as in LDCs, ruling
stratum does not want to lose the rent they have been appropriating
for so long from the economy. But an even steeper decline forces
them to search for some measures that could conceivably alleviate
mounting problems, as it has been the case of the Soviet Union so
far.
Political economy of transition in post-STEs differs from that
in LDCs in other respects as well. Each change in economic
institutions and policies create those who gain or lose as a result
of its introduction. One has to reckon also with those who support
or oppose change for ideological reasons. In LDCs those who
perceive they stand to lose from liberalisation and privatisation
are numerous, well organised, even entrenched (see, e.g., Nelson,
1989 and Glade, 1991). Bureaucrats, as expected by public choice
theory, oppose the curtailment of their power of control over the
economy (and associated ability to appropriate rent). Trade unions
are opposed to cuts in subsidies and resultant price increases
following liberalisation. With respect to privatisation, they know
that governments use SOEs as a 'disguised welfare system' (Elicker,
1988, p.5) and fear unemployment, decline in union membership and
resultant loss of power. Even private sector is divided in its
attitudes. Businessmen belonging to the local oligarchy who
benefited from lucrative - and uncontested - state contracts are
afraid of competition. Others welcome new opportunities but fear
foreign competition (see, i.a., Tanoira, 1987, and Glade, 1991)- 5 -
Beside those who have vested interest in opposing transition,
including that of transfer of SOEs in private hands, there are
those who oppose it for ideological reasons (see Glade, 1991).
Intellectuals in LDCs, afflicted by socialist ideas, are
overwhelmingly against. Nationalist passions intermingle with
ideological ones, as liberalisation and privatisation are perceived
as reducing the degree of state's control over the economy through
sale of SOEs to foreigners. The military often oppose the
transition for nationalist reasons (quite apart from the fact that
their professional education makes hierarchical systems more
acceptable -and understandable - to the military than decentralised
ones I ) .
This is definitely not the case in post-STEs. First of all, the
two interest groups that have most to lose from the privatisation
(in fact from the transition to the market system as a whole) have
either disappeared or changed leadership. The present writer has
in mind communist parties as they were known before the transition
began. Since there are no communist party secretaries in
enterprises any more and no possibility to appropriate rent through
patronage and kickbacks, their public choice argument for
resistance to privatisation disappeared. And since they try to gain
new social-democratic credentials, they have to pay at least a lip
service to the market and private property. Thus, the resistance
is weak and resembles more a foot-dragging than a head-on collision
course.
The same type of resistance may be found in the bureaucracy*In
the latter it is further weakened by the fact that the new heads
of various bodies are ideologically committed to privatisation and
will not tolerate open subversion of respective programmes. In
consequence, resistance to privatisation may be expected to come
from two different sources.
Firstly, it stems from ideological commitment to collectivist
ideas of the non-communist type. That is, it must come from within
the new democratic (or at least non-communist) political elite to
enjoy the legitimacy. Secondly, it stems from the newly emerging,
merging, reorganising parties, unions, associations, etc. The
latter are nascent pressure groups in the making. As they perceive
their leaderships' or their members' interests to be threatened by
privatisation, they try to organise resistance campaigns. The
strength of the privatisation idea in post-Soviet-type economies -
is so potent, however, that they may be unable to cling to their
cherished collectivist ideas and have to opt for the second best.
Therefore, self-management may be abandoned in favour of employee
ownership, for example. These differences in political economy of
privatisation have been reflected in the battle for privatisation's
ground rules in Poland.
One more factor should also be taken into account in the
comparative framework applied here. It is the important fact that
economic transition, including privatisation, is taking place
parallel to political transition. The emergence of democratic
institutions meant also increased political articulation,
mobilisation and the probabiliity of conflict over competing
alternative solutions - including those of privatisation (with
respect to democratising LDCs, see Nelson, 1989, as well as Haggard- 6 -
and Kaufman, 1989). This puts post-STEs' transition programmes
under greater pressures than those of, say, Meiji Japan in the
XlXth century, Korea and Taiwan in early 1960s or Chile in 1970s
and 1980s.
EARLY IDEOLOGICAL BATTLES
The appointment of the first non-communist government in Poland
should be regarded
r as a starting point of political - in contrast
to intellectual - debate about privatisation. The economic team of
the government completed in September 1989 has been strongly
committed to privatisation . This commitment found its reflection
in the outline of government economic programme (Program
Gospodarczy, October 1989), where transformation of ownership was
listed as one of the explicit goals of a systemic change, the
Office of the Government's Plenipotentiary for Ownership
Transformation was to be established, and references to
privatisation preferences were made.
The foregoing was not greeted with the uniform approval among
the winners of political change. It should be realised that the
Round Table agreement between communists and 'Solidarity' stressed
much more strongly workers' self-management and 'industrial
democracy' than privatisation. This was not only due to the nature
of one negotiating party (i.e. communists) but also because the
composition of the
1 'Solidarity' economic team was such that it gave
strong numerical preponderance to believers in the 'Third Way' .
This was not an accident but the result of conscious selection made
by main 'Solidarity' negotiators - almost to the one believers in
some form of socialism.
The 'Round Table' document stressed not only self-management in
state-owned enterprises and self-management representation at the
national level but even postulated the extension of self-management
to private enterprises employing more than 100 people. Regardless
of the unequivocal view of economic theory on efficiency of self-
management and the failed experience of Yugoslavia (particularly
disastrous in the late 1980s!), believers in the 'Third Way'
undertook yet another ideological offensive. Claiming that the
government programme is a departure from the 'Round Table', the
believers demanded the the state sector be transformed into a self-
management sector and state property be transformed into the
collective property of self-managing bodies in these enterprises
(see, e.g., Zmiany, 1989, No.15).
Similar calls were heard on various fora such as National Self-
Management Forum, Association of Self-Management Activists, etc.
Although their calls were not heeded by the government preparing
its own privatisation programme, a small group of parliamentary
supporters of self-management continued raising these demands
whenever privatisation was debated in the parliament.
The attitude of 'Solidarity' camp to self-management has been
rooted in ambiguity. On the one hand, historically self-management
was a 'Solidarity' battle-cry in 1980-1981 and later as a defence
against the arbitrariness and corruption of communist nomenklatura.
On the other, the 'return to European tradition' has been vaguely
perceived as being in conflict with the '• self -managed economy' and
other 'Third Way' experiments. Some 'Solidarity' leaders could not— 7 —
bring themselves to have said to their collegues, also combatants
against communism, that self-management was an idea whose time has
come - and gone.
This ambiguity was seen also in the documents for the Second
Congress of 'Solidarity' Trade Union in Spring 1990. The victorious
union supported in the same breath transformation of state property
into more efficient forms of ownership and demanded greater
industrial democracy, including employees' influence upon the
selection of management, investment policies, etc. It also gave its
explicit support for 'enlivening' the activity of self-management
bodies in state-owned enterprises (see the draft of the programme,
Gazeta Wyborcza, March 23, 1990). The ambiguity continued
throughout the whole period under consideration.
Believers in the 'Third Way' did not give up their hopes. They
vigorously criticised the government and personally the head of the
Office of Government's Plenipotentiary for Ownership Transformation
(OGPOT). Seeing no effects of their crusade run in ideological
terms, they decided to appeal to people's envy. Some government
officials and parlamentarians were accused of hoping to profit from
consulting fees to be charged in the privatisation process by the
firms with which they were associated. They even went so far as to
accuse the government of 'purposeful destruction of (state-owned)
enterprises so that some people could buy them cheaply' (Gazeta
Wyborcza, March 28, 1990).
Allegations' campaign did not change government's course but was
not actively counteracted by any purposeful information effort
either. This neglect of interaction with the public has been
unfortunately one of the characteristic features of economic teams
of both 'Solidarity'-supported governments. In this particular area
it has been singularly unfortunate. Parasitic activity of
nomenklatura in the last period of communist rule made many
employees distrustful of the very term 'ownership transformation'.
They saw the rip-off in 1988-1989 with their own eyes and now
allegations of that sort fell in many cases on the fertile ground.
Although they did not affect the legislative process, they
certainly did not increase the enthusiasm for privatisation.
One important change was taking place at exactly that time in
the political battle for the final shape of the government
privatisation programme. Seeing that their self-management ideal
is unable to whip up the expected support among employees,
activists decided to embrace a theoretically and practically less
objectionable solution, namely employee stock ownership.
Armed with the knowledge of American and British experts on
ESOP (employee stock-ownership plan) they presented - through a
group of sympathetic parlamentarians - an alternative to the
government privatisation bill. However, before presenting further
developments in the battle for ground rules between the believers
in some 'Third Way' and those who wanted to return to a capitalist
market system, intra-government considerations and government's
interaction with other privatisation supporters need some
elaboration as well.
To begin with, both the tactics and the goals of the government
in the privatisation area raised many doubts. The tactics assumed
near total concentration on the legal framework for privatisation.- 8 -
One draft of the privatisation law succeeded another without much
thought being given to goals of the whole venture. This curious
neglect stemmed - in the opinion of the present writer - from the
strong appeal that British privatisation of the post-197 9 period
had for the economic team of the government.
From the outline of government economic programme in October
1990 through various statements emanating from the Office of
Government Plenipotentiary for Ownership Transformation to the
final draft of the privatisation law (passed by the parliament in
July 1990) the sale of shares - more precisely: small packages of
shares - to citizens was seen as the privatisation method. And
since the means dominated goals, spreading the shareholding as
widely as possible became by default the goal of
government-sponsored privatisation. The fact that widespread
shareholding could be achieved by other means as well was not even
considered at the time.
The narrow, tunnel-like vision of the government on
privatisation issue was not unnoticed among liberal-minded
politicians and economists. Nor was near total neglect of the
political economy of privatisation, that is government apparent
unwillingness or inability to look for supporters for the
privatisation programme. A group of economists wrote a letter to
'Solidarity' trade union leadership warning already in December
1989 that the government 'does not see the need for political
support with respect to this key measure' (i.e. privatisation).
They also argued that highly visible privatisation steps would
increase the popular acceptance of this crucial measure (Beksiak,
Eysymontt, Gruszecki, Stankiewicz and Winiecki, 1989).
This and other cases of liberal critique made the
plenipotentiary to remark that he must struggle with two
'extremes': 'Liberals would like to give everything away and
privatise the Republic in three years' and 'protagonists of ESOP
who would like to make this the universal solution' (Zycie
Gospodarcze, 1990, No.12). The show of centrist moderation
notwithstanding, it is in fact due to the unceasing efforts of
liberals in the parliament that the final draft of the
privatisation law passed by the parliament contained the provision
that allowed the government to proceed with privatisation through
other means than public sale.
Otherwise, the government succeded in both thwarting the attempt
of employee ownership supporters to supersede government's draft
with their own and in preventing the free distribution of shares
to citizenry from becoming alternatives or even complements to its
preferred privatisation method. Curious situation developed. The
government victory was widely hailed as a decisive privatisation
step. But it was paper victory, with little if any privatisation
following the law (half a year later only 5 enterprises were
privatised). Moreover, what believers in the 'Third Way' lost in
the parliament, they made up at the enterprise level, where the
climate for privatisation was getting progressively worse.
Obviously, the dream of the 'Third Way' had to be abandoned
(probably forever). Some self-management activists saw, however,
the chance for themselves in closed ESOP-type companies whose
owners would exclusively or largely be their employees. Self-- 9 -
management activists would then, most probably, become board
members. Their power position would continue undiminshed, while
material benefits drawn from the change would undoubtedly be
enhanced.
PRIVATISATION AND THE GROPING
FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT
In this author's view Spring 1990 marks an end of the almost
purely 'ideological' period in political economy of privatisation
in Poland. The passage of the law on privatisation of state
enterprises (July 13, 1990), was a clear ideological victory for
the political forces that regarded as their priority the return to
the capitalist market system rather than the search for some
'Third Way' (and the one already recognised as failure at that).
However, not only opinions differed how to get 'from here to
there', that is from an STE to a capitalist market economy, but
also how to obtain support for privatisation practice
(once the ground rules were established).
This has become all the more important as the privatisation law
of July 13, 1990, established the basic rule that a state
enterprise may be privatised only at the request filed jointly by
the manager and the self-management board (that must seek earlier
the opinion of the general meeting of employees) or at the request
of the respective supervising minister filed after obtaining the
approval of the manager and the self-management board (the opinion
of the general meeting of employees was also required).
It becomes immediately clear that the passage of the law did not
pave the way for privatisation in Poland and the privatisation of
each enterprise depends on prior approval of the decision by its
employees. And, let it be noted, the self-management board - a body
in the hands of privatisation opponents - has the legal right to
accept privatisation. No less obvious is the influence that self-
management activists may have upon the opinion of employees in
privatisation matters.
The maturing of political debate about privatisation,
paradixically, strengthened the hand of protagonists of employee-
centered transformation of ownership. Once they abandoned the
obviously fallacious 'Third Way' dream of self-managed state sector
and shifted their attention to ESOP-type solutions, the pressure
for privatisation solutions deemed to be favourable for employees
increased. This pressure was the result of appeals of trade
unionists and self-management activists to employees' self-
interest. The slogan 'we, enterprise employees, created the wealth
that is embodied in the enterprise and therefore it should belong
to us' became quite popular among employees in state-owned
enterprises.
The demagoguery of such a slogan needs no elaborated response.
It is obvious that others, through taxes, also contributed to the
creation of SOEs, which - as implied by the slogan - should now
become the property of its employees (excluding everybody else).
Furthermore, others contributed more than industrial employees
to the creation of SOEs. The wage and salary structure in STEs has
always been skewed in favour of industry in comparison with market
economies (see, i.a., Winiecki, 1988). Employees in the service- 10 -
sector earned not only absolutely but also relatively less than in
non-STEs at similar level of development. Therefore, there has been
no economic reason to exclude doctors, teachers,
university professors and others from the benefits of
privatisation.
There were no reasons on the ground of fairness, either.
Besides, on the ground of fairness there were no reasons to accept
very large differences in the benefits of such privatisation
between employees in capital- and labour-intensive enterprises for
the latter would be at a marked disadvantage. However, one of the
signs of maturing political economy of privatisation was the
emergence of the lobby of largest (usually capital-intensive)
enterprises, whose representatives knew that however weak was their
rationale, they were a power to be reckoned with and were ready to
use that power to further their own - and purportedly employees' -
interests. A 'redistributive coalition' in Olson (1982) terms came
into being ready to block any practical privatisation move if their
interests are not taken into account. It is no surprise, then, that
a year after - in Summer 1991 - no privatisation of a large
enterprise took place in Poland.
Thus, self-management activists succeeded in becoming the first
organised pressure group participating in the privatisation process
within the framework of the established ground rules they opposed
so vehemently in the recent past. Less ideologically cohesive but
more firmly based on employees' self-interest, this group acts in
concert only in demanding various privileges for employees wanting
to take over enterprises as a whole or to buy shares of otherwise
privatised enterprises. Individually, they try to negotiate the
best deal at the enterprise level. Since the stakes are highest
in large, capital-intensive enterprises, the pressure is strongest
there.
Now, the maturing of privatisation politics became also visible
elsewhere. The government until Spring 1990 did not see the need
to present convincingly its own ideas of privatisation to the
general public, let alone to find supporters for it. A (partial)
change of heart took place in Summer 1990, when some other ideas
than public sale of shares of privatised enterprise became for the
first time taken into account. Distribution of shares free of
charge to all grown up citizens, an idea already firmly established
in Polish debates, was considered, although on a rather small
scale. No concrete proposals were, however, officially integrated
into government's privatisation programme. The situation did not
change until the resignation of Mr. Mazowiecki's cabinet in
November 1990, i.e. after presidential election.
It is the presidential election in Poland in Autumn 1990 that
again made privatisation an important object of political debate.
Mr. Walesa promised Polish citizens an 'acceleration' of the
difficult transition to capitalism and democracy. Since the chosen
method of privatisation by Mazowiecki's government ensured that the
the ownership transformation will last for many decades (if not
actually centuries 1), privatisation became one of the areas, where
Walesa's camp saw both the need and the possibility to move more
rapidly.
This became all the easier as in his camp were politicians and- 11 -
analysts who from the start offered alternatives to British style
public sale. 'Citizens' privatisation' formulated by Lewandowski
and Szomburg (1988 and 1989) who preferred 'shortcut' method of
free distribution of shares to all citizens in order to get rid of
state ownership as fast as possible caught the imagination of Mr.
Walesa and many other politicians in his camp. Some liberal-minded
politicians and analysts saw yet another advantage of this method.
It not only made it possible to accelerate the whole privatisation
process but also gave them the possibility to generate grass roots'
support for privatisation. Political support of a large segment of
citizenry could create a political counterweight to another, less
efficient, alternative of employees' ownership, made popular in
many state-owned industrial enterprises (as a result of the already
mentioned untiring campaign of self-management activists).
Less clear at the time was an appreciation of the fact that
large but dispersed constituency is not as efficient in pursuing
common goal as small but well integrated one (see Olson, 1965, as
well as various works of public choice theorists). Therefore, even
the reconstruction of the government by Mr. Walesa after his
election as the first president of post-communist Poland and the
nomination of Mr. Lewandowski, a co-architect of 'citizens'
privatisation', to the post of a minister of privatisation did not
change the balance of power at the micro level. The new minister
has had to live with the existing rules that gave self-management
boards (and employees in general) the right to accept or reject
privatisation.
Nonetheless, under the new leadership Ministry for Privatisation
(transformed in July 1990 from the Office of Government's
Plenipotentiary for Ownership Transformation) showed much more
flexibility. Work on practical programme of free distribution of
shares has been given much greater weight. Employee share ownership
was encouraged as long as it ensured the transferablity of shares
(i.e. did not exclude an allocating role of capital market).
Majority ownership investment by some large Western foreign
investors (not too numerous in any case) were accepted. But the .
basic problem remained.
Privatisation other than employee ownership was in most cases
greeted by employees with hostility. Self-managment boards and
trade unions (including 'Solidarity') in enterprises have not only
been leading but more often than not also inciting the resistance.
Interestingly this resistance was as strong in the case of
potential Western as in the case of domestic buyers. And,
ironically, as strong in the case of private as collective owners
(see, e.g., Kusmierek, 1991). The chances to win a large part of
the public for the far reaching 'citizens' privatisation' and
convert this support into political action neutralising strong
opponents seems to have been irretrievably lost. Employees'
determination to stick to what they have, regardless of the
unpalatability and increasing fragility of what they have (or, in
reality, they thought they have) made them impregnated
against everything else, inclusive of societal disapproval.
In fact any such disapproval has not been clearly articulated,
let alone used skilfully in the political campaign for
privatisation. Twists of post-communist politics in Poland put- 12 -
temporarily both liberals and left-wing activists of self-
management in the same political camp of Mr. Walesa. Any such
campaign would of necessity affect his relationship with employees
of largest industrial enterprises and undermined his political
base. Therefore it was never tried.
Thus, 'the leading role of the proletariat' outlived communism,
while trade unions, including 'Solidarity', became increasingly a
drag on transition programme. Poland's privatisation has been
falling behind some other post-STEs to an important extent due to
politicised unionism and self-management. For both groups of
activists ownership status quo protected their enhanced power
position at the enterprise level and they were successful in
maintaining that position by whetting employees appetites beyond
any reasonable bounds. Such petrification in form or in substance
(after transformation into employee-owned or leased enterprise)
does not augur well for efficiency and, consequently, for future
welfare of these employees. This, however, does not seem to bother
those who played their little power games in state-owned
enterprises.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATISATION ELSEWHERE:
SOME SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE
A post-Soviet-type economy with which Poland shares most
similarities is undoubtedly Hungary. Unfortunately, similarities
regardless, political economy of privatisation suggests
privatisation process much easier politically in the latter than
in the former. Different distribution of power in Hungary generates
less political pressure in favour of ownership forms that are
inimical to economic efficiency. Let us begin, however, with the
similarities.
Thus, first Hungarian democratic government intervened in what
has been called 'spontaneous' privatisation in that country and
established tighter control over the whole privatisation process.
This has been understandable because '• spontaneous' privatisation
was in many cases little else than get-rich-quick activity of
communist nomenklatura. The government steered through the
parliament increased powers for the State Property Agency that as
of July 1990 has become the title holder of all assets managed by
Hungarian state-owned enterprises and monitors all substantial
changes in the ownership structure of SOEs' assets. All cases of
ownership transformation are supervised by SPA.
Although this measure was criticised by the main opposition
party, Free Democrats (an unusual mix of socialists and liberals)
for the extension of state power in the transition to the market,
from the political economy vantage point the measure in question
was undoubtedly a right one. Just as in Poland, privatisation's
reputation has been damaged by parasitic activities of the
nomenklatura and a clear signal for the society has been needed.
Without it, any legitimacy of privatisation in the eyes of many
would be lost. Whatever losses in privatisation's speed has been
registered, they were made up in terms of legitimacy.
Even more criticised by the opposition was Hungarian Democratic
Forum's proposal of confiscation of the property obtained by
communist nomenklatura through political patronage, so-called Plan- 13 -
Justitia (see its critique, i.a., by Janos Kiss, Kurir, September
27, 1990). This proposal was in stark contrast with the 'thick
line' philosophy (dividing the past from from the present) of Mr.
Mazowiecki's government but very much in line with somewhat more
vague proposals to that effect emanating from Mr. Walesa camp
during presidential campaign. • "
Precision of such proposals regardless, their implementation was
next to impossible due to the nature of the legal system under the
communist regime where rip-off was made possible under the rules
often established specifically for the purpose. Since only
transgressions of the (communist) law could be prosecuted, the
results could not be very impressive - and they were not in either
country.
Similarities between Poland and Hungary did not end there. One
should add to the foregoing also missing attempts on the side of
both governments to actively enlist public support for the
privatisation issue. But this 'similarity in ommission' has had
markedly different effects in each country. The ruling coalition
in Hungary witnessed very much weaker challenge of the sort
described in the preceding two sections of the paper. In fact, the
strongest opposition party, Free Democrats, stressed faster - and
also less supervised - privatisation.
Within the political spectrum, Hungarian Socialist Party (former
communists) treaded softly on the privatisation issue and only some
marginal groups: orthodox communists and new leftists of the Left
Alternative type rejected privatisation. Fortunately for Hungarian
economy these groups were devoid of any real support where it
mattered most, that is among the employees of SOEs.
On a broader plane major trade unions continued to be in
communist hands and therefore - in spite of vigorous criticism of,
i.a., privatisation - their influence has been extremely limited
on larger issues of the transition to the market system. Nor,
probably due to their dogmatic rejection of privatisation, were
they able to whet workers appetite for ownership of enterprises
they work in. :
In contrast, workers councils (self-management bodies) were
created - in fact revived - by individuals long associated with
former non-communist opposition. They cropped up since 1989 in many
Hungarian enterprises. Their ideas have not been all that different
from Polish self-management activists (demands of control over
management, employees ownership through shareholding, etc.).
However, in spite of its linkages to Hungarian Democratic Forum -
or may be because of it - the resistance to other forms of
ownership has been rather weak. Some of the old workers councils'
activists were initially hostile, e.g., to foreign investment, but
never got the upper hand (Pataki, 1991, March 29).
It is probably due to the weakness of the left in the Hungarian
power structure that the imagination of employees in Hungarian SOEs
has never been fanned by the mirages of 'manna from heaven'
resulting from employee ownership. Lack of credibility of old
communist institutions and weak roots of the new democratic and
'Third Way'-type left among SOEs' employees made their resistance
to privatisation relatively ineffective.
Poland shares with Yugoslavia strong attachment of the left to- 14 -
the self-management model. In fact, the attachment to that model
has been stronger still in Yugoslavia, given the latter role as an
inventor (and, worse still, also an innovator...) of the model.
Four decades of tauting the 'Third Way' to Yugoslav population and
the world at large created strong, almost Pavlovian reflexes.
Therefore, in spite of its increasingly recognised anachronistic
nature, privatisation initiatives have tended to be direct
descendants of the self-management system.
All consecutive privatisation programmes have been trying to
save the collective or - at the very least - employee ownership-
based enterprise, (see, i.e. Gruszecki and Winiecki, 1991). The
latest known to the present writer suggests an ESOP-type solution.
With their unerring instinct for grasping always the wrong end of
the stick, the type of ESOP chosen was the worst imaginable: the
large majority of shares sold (at preferential prices) to the
employees and the shares are for the foreseeable future made non-
transferable (so-called 'social' shares). Also, the money from
these sales in which, apart from employees, other state-owned but
self-managed enterprises may take part will be placed in republican
development funds. Thus, they will again be used by the state (or
the republics), ensuring bureaucratic continuity of financial
support. This is not at all surprising. After all, consecutive
programmes were designed by those who benefited from the old system
- communist party apparatchiks and bureacrats - who would retain
at least part of their old power (and privilege) under the proposed
regime (Pejovich, 1990).
The difference between Poland and Yugoslavia is that employee
ownership - collective or individual - has been pushed by different
forces. In Poland self-management has been associated with the
politically ascendant 'Solidarity' while the reverse is true in the
case of Yugoslavia. In theory, the, the defeat of these inefficient
solutions may be over time easier in Yugoslavia, once communists
lose their position there.
In practice, however, almost forty years of indoctrination
coupled with actual ability to appropriate benefits from state
ownership through self-management without bearing corresponding
costs made the belief in employee ownership a deeply ingrained
idea. Thus, any other type of privatisation is expected to be
strongly resisted. This author uses the term 'expected' for nothing
has been really tried so far. In the area of privatisation
Yugoslavia is obviously at the very preliminary stage - first of
all due to its unsolved political problems with communist dominance
in some republics (Winiecki, 1990b) and unsolved final shape of the
country as a whole.
With political conditions being more encouraging at the
republican rather than federal level, privatisation may proceed
faster in some republics than others. Slovenia, for example, well
understood the need to create strong alliance in favour of
privatisation. Draft of the privatisation bill puts stress on
'citizens' privatisation' rather than employee ownership, which is
undoubtedly a better solution from the viewpoint of both economics
and political economy of privatisation (this is not necessarily
well understood, see, e.g., Sire, 1991). Other prospective measures
show a lot of hesitation, as far the creation of full-blooded- 15 -
capitalist market economy is concerned.
Least similarity exists between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. In
the latter, the economic team understood perfectly well the
importance of political support for such a major change as
privatisation of the state sector. Therefore, from the start they
put in the forefront 'citizens' privatisation' through the voucher
system enabling every grown-up person to bid for shares in
privatised enterprises. Thus, a large part of the general public
has been from the start positively inclined to the idea.
The foregoing has been an element of conscious choice dictated
by the political economy of privatisation. It is probably due to
the expectation of widespread support by the general public that
protagonists of privatisation in the government and the ruling
coalition were able to prevail over adherents to the ideas of the
'Third Way' Protagonists of the latter, the left wing of the Civic
Forum, by and large conceded the defeat.
Interestingly, another difference between Poland and
Czechoslovakia is that after the defeat in the battle for ground
rules of privatisation, believers in the 'Third Way' did not shift
 ;
the battleground from macro to micro level. This had presumably
less to do with the differences in evolving political rules of the
game and more with the weak roots of collectivists within Civic
Forum at the enterprise level. They were mostly former communist
party intelllectuals who had spearheaded the 1968 'socialism with
human face' reforms who, in contrast to 'Solidarity' activists had
different origin and, accordingly, different modus operandi. Thus,
broad, populist movements of the 'Solidarity' type show their
positive role in destroying totalitarian (or other despotic)
regimes but reveal destructive features in the transition phase to
the efficient economic system (see cautious remarks on this point
in Kondziela, 1991).
Finally, self-management and the 'Third Way' apart, Czecho-
slovak trade unions after getting rid of the communist leadership
concentrated upon what trade unions traditionally do best, whether
within the centralised or decentralised structure. Unsurprisingly,
this was not rallies in favour of or demands for workers' control
over enterprises. They stressed the need for - and obtained in
early 1991 - clear rules on collective bargaining, employment,
redundancies, minimum wage, etc. They also obtained a regular
consultation mechanism through the Council of Economic and Social
Accord (see Oberman, 1991, March 29, on all the issues referred to
above).
In the opinion of the present writer, the behaviour of Czecho-
slovak trade unions, as compared to that of all other union
organisations in East-Central Europe, reflects strongly the
democratic tradition of the past - and the role of trade unions
within such political structure. Other unions either perceive
themselves as 'defenders of the working class' in the destructive
Marxist manner (Hungarian and Polish post-communist unions) or as
populist movements in search of some unspecified (but unconsciously
egalitarian) ideals of social justice at all levels, including
enterprise level. Both lead to destructive demands and further
economic decline.
In conclusion, the dynamics of the political economy of- 16 -
privatisation in post-Soviet-type economies is shaped by a range
of factors. An important factor is the composition of political
elites in post-communist countries. They are for the most part real
social reformers (regardless of differences in their ideals). The
predatory state in the North (1979, 1981) sense as an operational
ideal is generally foreign to them.
Another factor is linked to the political acceptance of
privatisation programmes per se. The appeal of a programme to large
segments of the society affects not only its passage at the
legislative stage, as various political and economic orientation
sense the preferences of the electorate, but also its probability
of success at the implementation stage. Resistance to a programme
that apparently enjoys huge popularity is expected to be weaker due
to the perceived costs of such resistance.
And last, but certainly not least, political history, both
recent and more distant one, affects strongly privatisation
process. Recent history of the formation of new political elite is
important because it either reduces or enhances the probability of
shifting political battles from its proper, i.e. political arena
to destructive politicking at the enterprise level, i.e. economic
arena. In post-communist countries the threat of such a shift is
always stronger than elsewhere, given the decades of indoctrination
about the 'leading role' of the working class. This has not been
believed under the communist but its downfall may have been read
by some as a call for the final implemenattion of such a role
through workers' control over enterprises. Regardless of general
acceptance of the democracy and the market such ideas have surfaced
with varied intensity almost everywhere.
Within the foregoing framework, the traditional pattern of
emergence of political elites, as observed in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, certainly helped to reduce the probability of
destructive enterprise level battles for control over state-owned
enterprises, while the emergence of a revolutionary social movement
in Poland, that is 'Solidarity' had the opposite effect. Also,
Hungary's privatisation programme has been helped by the historical
accident of the recent past: the widely shared perception of
Hungarian trade unions as fossilized die-hard communists unable to
defend employees rights in an emerging market economy. Therefore
they are unable to play the same destructive role communist trade
unions play in Poland where they compete with 'Solidarity' trade
unions by pushing up ever higher wage and non-wage claims.
Distant history is also a factor affecting political economy of
privatisation in post-STEs. What Hungarian government intent on
privatisation received as a gift from capricious history
(destructive but accidentally also ineffective union), Czecho-
slovak government obtained as a consequence of that country
tradition of moderation and understanding by the trade unions of
their constructive role in the re-emerging market economy.
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